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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I had been at Oxford for only two weeks when my doctoral supervisor, cognitive archaeologist Lambros 
Malafouris, introduced me to an eminently distinguished and intimidatingly famous archaeologist, a scholar 
whose contributions to the field were so legendary they had been recognized not with mere knighthood but 
peerage. I speak, of course, of Colin Renfrew, Baron of Kaimsthorn, Fellow of the British Academy and the 
Society of Antiquaries, Emeritus Disney Professor of Archaeology at Cambridge University, Senior Fellow of 
the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, one of the leading pioneers of cognitive archaeology, and 
Lambros’ own doctoral supervisor. With a flattering interest, Renfrew asked me the topic of my thesis. Upon 
learning it was the clay tokens used as numerical counters in Neolithic Mesopotamia, he snapped, ‘Those have 
been done to death! Why study them? Do something else!’ His emphatic doubt about what, if anything, the 
least bit interesting might be left to say about these artifacts has lingered at the back of my mind the several 
years since, daring me to address it. 
 Why study the Neolithic tokens? The question is highly pertinent, since indeed, the tokens have been 
investigated and published upon, extensively if not exhaustively, since archaeologists like Vivian Broman,1 A. Leo 
Oppenheim,2 and Pierre Amiet3 first noticed their shapes, sizes, and quantities corresponded to those of the clay 
impressions that preceded handwritten forms for numbers in the mid-to-late 4th-millennium BCE. The tokens’ role 
in the invention of writing has long been proclaimed, they themselves painstakingly catalogued and analyzed, at 
least as much as they were known up until the early 1990s, by archaeologist Denise Schmandt-Besserat.4 Lambros 
himself5 had already explored and written about their significance as components of the cognitive system for 
numbers, the very inquiry I was proposing to take up yet again. What could possibly be added to such work that 
was worthy of the undertaking? And, if such illustrious scholars had already discovered and said everything it was 
possible to know on the topic of tokens, what could a mere student bring to the inquiry? 
 Here it’s worth noting I had a somewhat different perspective on numbers than that of these 
antecessors. For the several years prior to starting at Oxford, I had worked at the University of Colorado at 
Colorado Springs with psychologist Frederick Coolidge and archaeologist Thomas Wynn. They had introduced 
me to the idea that change in the form of material artifacts over time could indicate cognitive change in the 
species making the artifacts. Wynn, another leading pioneer of cognitive archaeology, had discerned change in 
the spatial cognition of species ancestral to humans through their increasing imposition of shape and symmetry 
on stone tools.6 Coolidge had brought to their partnership the idea of investigating the expansion of working 
memory through artifacts like traps that implied such executive functions.7 In my own work with Coolidge and 
Wynn, much of my research had focused on understanding how number systems emerge from the perceptual 
experience of quantity humans share with other species, and how this differs from language.8 I had considered 
the questions of what numbers are and how we get them through the methods and data of psychology, language, 
and ethnography: what the brain does in numbers, how language puts number words together, and how peoples 
in different cultures and societies count. I had also investigated the links between language for numbers, cultural 
complexity, and numerical complexity,9 though by the time I arrived at Oxford, I was becoming increasingly 
 
1 Broman, Jarmo Figurines. 
2 Oppenheim, ‘On an Operational Device in Mesopotamian Bureaucracy’. 
3 Amiet, Mémoires de la Délégation Archéologique en Iran, Tome XLIII, Mission de Susiane. 
4 Schmandt-Besserat, Before Writing: From Counting to Cuneiform. 
5 Malafouris, ‘Grasping the Concept of Number: How Did the Sapient Mind Move beyond Approximation?’. 
6 Wynn, The Evolution of Spatial Competence. 
7 Coolidge and Wynn, ‘Executive Functions of the Frontal Lobes and the Evolutionary Ascendancy of Homo sapiens’. 
8 8 Coolidge and Overmann, ‘Numerosity, Abstraction, and the Emergence of Symbolic Thinking’. 
9 Overmann, ‘Material Scaffolds in Numbers and Time’; Numbers and Time: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of the Origin and Use of Numbers as 
a Cognitive Technology; ‘Numerosity Structures the Expression of Quantity in Lexical Numbers and Grammatical Number’. 
Introduction, The material origin of numbers: Insights from the archaeology of the Ancient Near East. 
 
dissatisfied with these findings, since they had only concluded, as other disciplines had,10 that there was some 
kind of a link, the details of which could not be determined. Further, I had not yet given much thought to what 
material forms for representing and manipulating numbers had to do with numerical origins and elaboration,11 
something Lambros encouraged me to do. 
 Once I started reading the Assyriological literature, I had enough background in anthropological theory 
to be disquieted by the claim that numbers were somehow concrete before they became abstract. This assumption 
pervaded the work of both Schmandt-Besserat12 and Malafouris,13 as well as that of other scholars writing about 
numerical origins and developmental acquisition—psychologists Peter Damerow and Jean Piaget.14 Since the 
1970s, cultural anthropology had more than frowned upon categorizing societies as either primitive or 
advanced, and as evolving from one to the other. Such proscriptions reacted to the discipline’s own origins in 
the work of 19th-century scholars like Edward Burnett Tylor, who announced his opinion of non-Western 
societies in the title of his most famous book: Primitive Culture.15 I had also encountered the idea of philosopher 
of mathematics Bertrand Russell that numbers are the recognition of cardinality shared between sets of 
objects.16 This seemed to me to be capable of bridging the gap between the perceptual experience of quantity 
and the conceptualization of number. These insights suggested the development of numerical concepts from 
the perceptual experience of quantity not only could but had to be explained without appealing to constructs 
that invoked inherently flawed and fortunately outdated assumptions about societal modes of thinking. 
 Other matters that immediately confronted my understanding of what numbers were like were the 
Assyriological claims that tokens were not used with number words, and that they were the first material form 
used for counting. From the vantage of my admittedly meager knowledge and experience, I intuited these 
simply had to be incorrect. Firstly, when numbers initially emerge in language, they are limited to, and quite 
consistent with, the perceptual experience of quantity: one and two, possibly three, and occasionally four, with 
numbers above that range being many, a characteristic noted for number words around the world, across 
significant spans of time, and by observers from vastly different fields.17 No known number system uses 
material forms to represent numbers in the hundreds and thousands, as the Mesopotamian tokens did at the 
point where impressions provide insight into how the tokens were used, while concomitantly lacking a 
comparable lexicon of number words; similarly, no known numerical lexicon lags behind the values represented 
materially to the extent being claimed for Mesopotamian numbers. These things suggested there would have 
been a numerical lexicon, even if the evidence for it was both limited and much later. 
 Secondly, although tokens may look rudimentary when viewed from the perspective of the complexity 
that mathematics reach by the Old Babylonian period (1900–1600 BCE), they do not from the perspective of 
how numbers first emerge. I had been studying the vocabularies, behaviors, and devices of traditional peoples 
taking their first, early steps into numbers; the tokens in comparison were overwhelmingly complex, as was the 
material culture of urbanized Mesopotamian agriculturalists when contrasted with that of nomadic hunter–
gatherers. For the tokens, this complexity lay in their being related to each other, with some quantity of lower-
value tokens being represented by and exchanged with a single token of higher value. This characteristic was 
something other than one-to-one correspondence, and it implied that tokens would have been preceded by 
other, simpler, technologies, with forms and structures that could explain how the first numbers consistent 
with the perceptual experience of quantity might eventually yield the relatively complex numerical concepts 
represented by tokens and later notations. Part of any investigation, then, needed to address the question of 
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precursor technologies, in terms of what might constitute evidence for them and how they might influence 
numerical content, structure, and organization. 
 Ultimately, my attempts to reconcile the Assyriological assumptions with my prior anthropological, 
psychological, and linguistic understandings of numbers provided me an opportunity to say something new, 
not just about the Neolithic tokens in Mesopotamian numbers but also about the role of material structures in 
human cognition more generally. This work, an updated version of my doctoral thesis, presents my view of 
how the material structures used to represent and manipulate numbers inform their content, structure, and 
organization: whether numbers are conceptualized as equivalences, collections, or entities; whether and to what 
extent they possess properties like linearity and magnitude ordering; and how closely tied they are as concepts—
or not—to particular material structures. Essentially, I view numbers as abstract from their inception and 
materially bound at their most elaborated. This view collapses the historical distinction between the so-called 
concrete and abstract modes of thinking. It also provides an elaborational mechanism, namely, the 
incorporation of additional material forms, that explains why and how number concepts change over time, 
reveals their inherent similarities and differences across cultures at a time and within societies over time, and 
explains how societies comprised of average individuals can be capable of realizing complex cultural systems 
like numeracy and mathematics in the first place. 
 Mesopotamia proved an ideal case study. It has an unusually long and detailed sequence of material 
devices used for counting—if one admits evidence from a variety of sources and then infers from it freely. 
Admittedly, such inferences have the potential to irk those of a historical bent, but they are not uncommon in 
archaeology. Textual evidence, which provides insight into the five-plus formations of the Sumerian numbers 
six, seven, and nine, suggests finger-counting, an assessment based on the presence and similar interpretation of 
identically compounded number words in other languages. This evidence occurs more than a thousand years 
after the invention of writing, and there is no known way of determining exactly when such number words 
originated. Positioning finger-counting as the earliest form of materially structured counting in Mesopotamia 
was inferred from the way finger-counting appears to work in other societies globally. Further, the fingers and 
hand have not traditionally been classified as material structures for counting, though an extensive literature 
attests to their being a somatic basis for it. Archaeological evidence suggests there were early tallies, which take 
the form of worked bones from the Epipaleolithic Levant.18 Not only is this time and place temporally, 
geographically, and culturally distinct from the later Mesopotamian societies who used tokens, examinations 
that can categorize notches as possibly quantificational in nature19 have not been performed on these artifacts, 
to the best of my knowledge. Tallies are the weakest link in my chain of inferences, though they fill what seems 
an otherwise inexplicable gap in the sequence of material devices, the transition off the body to one-dimensional 
material devices. The Neolithic clay tokens are fairly well known at this point, mainly through the extensive 
publications of Schmandt-Besserat, as are their correspondences with later, unambiguous, numerical 
notations.20 However, much like fingers and hands, written signs have not been previously investigated as 
material structures in the elaboration of number. But given status as a material structure, they too fill an 
explanatory gap, the conceptual change historically described as the transition from concrete to abstract 
numbers. 
 Whatever inferential holes mar the argument that fingers, tallies, tokens, and numerical notations form 
a material sequence elaborating initial number concepts into counting sequences and mathematics, however 
non-generalizable the sequence may be to societies other than Mesopotamia, the resultant framework 
nonetheless holds the potential to explain numerical prehistory cross-culturally. That is, material devices have 
long been recognized as representing and manipulating numbers.21 What is new about the present work is that 
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it explains what those material structures do in number concepts—not just anchoring and stabilizing them,22 
not only acting as proxies for their properties,23 but providing the very mechanism of elaboration. New devices 
for representing and manipulating numbers extend some of the capabilities provided by older devices, resolve 
some of their limitations, and inject new limitations that at some point may motivate the incorporation of even 
newer devices. This idea draws upon the work of ecological psychologist James Gibson,24 whose theory of 
material structures having exploitable properties (or affordances) was most illuminating and useful in this regard. 
Importantly, analysis of the properties, capabilities, and limitations of the devices used in Mesopotamian 
counting revealed an internal consistency to the sequence. 
 For this analysis, Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory (MET)25 proved an apt framework. MET 
is able to compare cognitive states without implicitly favoring later states over earlier ones, addressing my 
concern with avoiding the potential pitfalls of cultural categorization and societal modes of thinking. Because 
MET envisions cognition as the interaction of brain, body, and world, it let me consider the respective 
contributions of, and interactions among, the psychological, behavioral, and material dimensions of numbers. 
The framework has aspects that are debatable, if not controversial. For example, MET views cognition as both 
extended (cognition includes materiality as a constitutive element) and enactive (cognition is the interaction of 
brain, body, and materiality). It’s a good question whether investigating the role of materiality in numerical 
cognition requires that materiality be constitutive of cognition, rather than causally linked to it. I was skeptical 
on this exact point when I first encountered Malafouris’ work because, as one of my professors once expressed 
it, causal linkage is easy to demonstrate, constitutivity much harder. 
 Now after several years of learning to see cognition from a MET perspective, I have become a 
thorough convert. Readers of the present work will have to decide their level of commitment for themselves, 
of course. Here it will suffice to note that redrawing the boundaries of cognition to include materiality, as 
Malafouris invites us to do,26 raises the possibility of gaining new insights. I doubt the present work would have 
been possible without such redistricting. For example, as I investigated numerical notations as material 
structures, I also looked at how they differed from signs for non-numerical language, and how both changed 
over time. After this analysis and much thought,27 I came to see reading as an unambiguous example of 
cognition that is both extended and enactive, because it is a cognitive state that does not—indeed, cannot—
exist without engaging the material form that is writing. It is difficult to imagine what sort of thing reading 
could be, without engaging its material form. Once reading is admitted as example of extended and enacted 
cognition, what follows is the recognition that the material form has become increasingly effective at eliciting 
specific behaviors and psychological responses in its users. For other material forms, including those used for 
numerical representation and manipulation, what follows is not whether they are constitutive of cognition, but 
how. Mathematician Brian Rotman sees mathematical calculation by means of notations as an amalgam of 
thinking and scribbling,28 something Malafouris would describe as brain, body, and material forms being 
constitutively intertwined. And, as I explain in the book, the reason numerical notations differ from non-
numerical signs becomes explicable through Malafouris’ distinction between material and linguistic signs, and 
as a function of their different material prehistories. 
 This work is only an initial step in understanding how peoples use material forms to realize concepts 
of numbers, and how those concepts change over time through the incorporation of new material forms. 
Accordingly, this work needs to be, and hopefully will be, subject to correction, revision, and expansion by 
other scholars interested in answering questions of numerical origins and change. One loose end that might be 
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unraveled further is whether admitting materiality into numerical concepts sheds any new light on historical 
perspectives of what numbers are. That is, as concepts, numbers have properties that are unique and peculiar, 
like their intersubjective verifiability and our confidence in apprehending them.29 Certainly, peoples widely 
separated in space and time have come up with the same sequence of counting numbers, and given that 
sequence and a notion of divisibility, will converge on the same prime numbers. These properties have led 
thinkers since Plato to postulate that numbers are discovered, not invented, and as things that are discovered, 
must in some sense exist. If such properties truly originate in things like material semiosis and conceptual 
anchoring by the material forms used to represent and manipulate numbers, there may be some implications in 
this for mathematical realism. Along similar lines, the involvement of materiality in numerical concepts seems 
to at least partly refute the rather introspectionist idea that numbers are completely mental phenomena, the 
intuitionism of mathematician Luitzen Egbeurtus Jan Brouwer.30 Such extensions, however, must be worked 
out in future efforts, as they fall outside the scope of the present work. 
 I hope this work will further two ambitions. First, I want to change the language we use to characterize 
the differences between and within number systems. Beyond their being the rather distasteful fruit of an 
outdated view on societal difference, the terms abstract and concrete are just insufficiently descriptive. 
Characterizing numbers instead by their content, organization, and structure will help us, I believe, gain traction 
on how peoples become numerate by using material structures, something with implications for research into 
how numbers originate, how they vary between cultures, and how they change over time, along with the much 
larger issue of how material forms inform the ongoing cognitive change of our species. Second, I want this 
work to build upon the past research that is its basis, not start a wholly new way of conceiving and researching 
Ancient Near Eastern numbers. I don’t merely wish to avoid the problem of there being two competing 
approaches, I also want to recognize that previous scholars have pointed out real phenomena, matters the 
current state of research into numerical cognition now enables us to understand from a different perspective. 
 With these potential contributions to understanding numerical origins and elaboration, as well as the 
role of materiality in numerical cognition specifically and in human cognition and the development of complex 
cultural systems generally, I hope this work at last answers Professor Renfrew’s useful caveat and spur in a 
satisfactory and meaningful manner. 
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